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introduction 
While the complexity, diversity and detail of financial landscapes arc 
now widely appreciated: this in turn gives rise to the need for a more 
systematic approach to their conceptualisation. This paper uses a 
conceptual framework for the analysis of a financial market, which 
sees different types of financial intermediary as a response to the 
collective action problem of financial intermediation. Each type of 
financial intermediary - whether formal or informal - has rules, 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms as organisations and in 
respect of their deposits and loans. The key solutions to collective 
action problems are the state; the firm and co-operative based 
organisations and these therefore create distinct branches to the 
financial market. 
The implementation of rules depends not only on legislated laws but 
also on customs and norms. The effectiveness of particular types of 
intermediary is dependent on the way in which rules and the 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms they require function in a 
particular context. This framework therefore allows an examination of 
the way in which the political, economic, social and cultural context 
influences rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
The paper goes on to illustrate the use of the conceptual framework in 
relation to the financial market in Karatina in Kenya. There is a range 
of financial intermediaries in the market spanning the formal and 
informal sectors. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the 
usefulness of the conceptual framework by showing the importance of 
the social sanction of shame 111 disciplining ROSCA members. The way 
m which social sanctions operate is key to the effectiveness of many 
informal financial arrangements. In this case we find that shame is 
reported to be experienced differently by men and women and this 
helps explain why men are less able to mobilise themselves into 
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ROSCAs than women. Thus the way in which financial markets are 
rooted in social relations, such as gender, becomes clear. 
The Need for an Institutional Framework 
The research set out to investigate the financial market in a small 
market town, Karatma, in Kenya. The first step was a survey of 
financial service providers to determine the array of financial services 
available. This involved an analysis of savings and loan products that 
iooked at prices, terms and conditions, The approach promoted by the 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) suggests the need to analyse prices 
in terms of the costs of funds, of administration and default and profit 
(return on stockholders equity). It argues that differences in interest 
rales between providers should therefore be explained by variations in 
the costs of funds, administration and default. Or put around the other 
way, differences in profitability should be able to be explained by 
di fferences in transaction costs and risk. However some of the features 
that arose from the overview of financial service providers in Karatina, 
suggested problems for utilising this analysis of differences in interest 
rates and profitability. 
A wide range of financial services is available in Karatina: banks, 
building societies, savings and credit co-operatives, parastatals, NGO 
based microfinance, moneylenders, rotating savings and credit 
associations, accumulating savings and credit associations, informal 
insurance groups and so on. It became apparent that two forms of 
financial intermediary - SACCOs (Savings and Credit Co-operatives 
or Credit Unions) and Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations 
(A SCR As) - do not conform to attempts to analyse savings and loan 
products separately. In these institutions the savers are the borrowers 
- demand is not independent of supply - you can only borrow from the 
institution if you have first saved there and the loan to which you are 
eligible is a function of your level of saving. 
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Second, the interest r3te paid on loans in SACCOs and ASCRAs 
directly affects the dividend paid on shares. Hence, in ASCRAs we 
observe members willing to pay high rates of interest on loans 
compared to products elsewhere in the market. For example, often at 
10% per month which when savings requirements of half the loan are 
taken into account represents some 240% on short term advances. But 
this is acceptable to members because at the end of the year the 
dividend on their shares (savings) reflects this interest rate and may be 
in the region of 20-50%. SACCOs are in a sense the converse of this. 
Members pay what they recognise as relatively low interest rates on 
loans (1 2% nominal per annum, but in the region of 30% once savings 
requirements are taken into account) but are willing to accept relatively 
low rates of return on their shares in the form of dividends as a result. 
The reason why members join these systems is because they can get 
access to loans. Once you are in a SACCO, as long as you meet the 
conditions and funds are available, you arc entitled to borrow. 
Similarly for an ASCRA - once you are a member, your ability to 
borrow is virtually guaranteed (unless and until you default). This 
feature is due to the fact that these organisations are based on a model 
of member ownership of the financial intermediary. So members save 
in order to be able to borrow and since they own the organisation they 
can trade of f the cost of loans against the return on their savings. 
A number of other observations flow from this starting point. The 
profile of transactions costs that a SACCO or ASCRA will incur in 
making a loan are different to those incurred by a bank. In the case of 
a SACCO. the borrower is usually a long-term member of the SACCO 
who has saved over a number of years. A number of the borrower 's 
characteristics are already known. In the case of S A C C O s in Kenya 
this is primarily the income source which forms the common bond of 
(he SACCO. Further, the loan may be guaranteed by the member ' s 
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shares and by the shares of other guarantors. These factors reduce the 
screening costs, as well as the potential enforcement costs that the 
SACCO will incur in lending to a member. Indeed the screening 
function has in effect already been carried out by the way the 
organisation has been formed and for ASCRAs which don ' t have a 
common bond this usually on the basis of individual members local 
knowledge of each other. Hence screening costs at the actual point of 
making a loan are negligible compared to the process that the bank has 
lo pursue in lending to borrowers that it may not know. So that it does 
not make sense to apply an analysis of transaction costs independently 
of the types of institutional form that is being considered. 
Data for formal and semi-formal financial institutions in Karatina 
indicates that SACC'Os and managed ASCRAs account for some 20% 
of deposits but represent 52% of savings accounts and 31 % of loans by 
volume. Nor does this take account of funds in and membership of, 
SACCOs at the national level, or in ASCRAs in the informal sector 
which are not captured by this data. The need therefore to have an 
analytical framework that can deal effectively with why individuals 
make decisions to engage with these types of financial institutions 
therefore appears crucial and critically related to the nature of their 
institutional form. The next section takes up this insight and seeks to 
develop an approach to analysing financial intermediaries, which is 
built on an analysis of their institutional form. 
Financial intermediation; an institutional Approach 
A significant range of financial institutions usually exists in any 
context including banks, savings and credit co-operative societies 
(SACC'Os, and also known as Credit Unions), parastatals, NGOs 
offering credit, moneylenders, informal savings groups such as 
ROSCAs and ASCRAs. Ail of these are solutions to the problem of 
financial intermediation - how to match the supply and demand for 
4 
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funds - which is m turn a collective action problem. The way 111 
which collective action problems are solved is through the creation of 
institutions 
The Design of Institutions for Collective Action 
In the broadest possible sense, people require rules of engagement to 
structure their interaction. Hence North describes institutions as "the 
rules of the game of a society, or more formally, as the humanly 
devised constraints that structure human interaction" (North 1990). 
He goes on to distinguish formal and informal rules, i.e. those which 
become codified in common and statute laws and regulation and those 
which do not. with informal rules often being referred to as norms. 
Thus the range of institutions stretches from the rules of etiquette to 
criminal law. 
As Ostrom puts it in her ground breaking work on institutions for the 
management of common property resources, ""Institutions" can be 
defined as the sets of working rules that are used to determine who is 
eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or 
constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must 
be followed, what information must or must not be provided and what 
payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent 011 their actions... All 
rules contain prescriptions that forbid, permit or require some action or 
outcome", (Ostrom 1990, p51). This suggests a need to analyse (he 
rules along with the procedures that are necessary to monitor conduct 
and enforce compliance. 
Ostrom points out that theories of the firm and the slate each provide 
a solution to the collective action problem. The firm operates by 
allowing an entrepreneur to negotiate contracts with a range of 
participants that specify the ways in which fhey will act in a co-
ordinated way. In deciding whether or not to participate (assuming 
5 
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voluntary participation) each participant gives up some choices and as 
a result of this the entrepreneur can pay each of the agents retaining 
residual profi ts (or bearing losses). The implication of this model is 
that the entrepreneur is motivated to organise the activity efficiently 
and maximise profits. The state is another and particular solution to 
the collective action problem. The state by having a monopoly of the 
use of force can impose rules and enforce them using sanctions. Hence 
the state can organise a range of activities for collective benefit . 
In highlighting the role of the state and the f irm as collective action 
institutions Ostrom suggests tiiat the "absence of a theory that would 
identify the mechanisms by which a group of individuals could 
organise themselves" (p40, my italics) become clear. Her work then 
seeks to identify the design principles that underlie successful attempts 
by groups of individuals to manage CPRs. The specifics of the design 
principles she derives do not directly apply to the case of financial 
institutions. There are fundamental ly different features involved. For 
example, for CPRs there is a problem of non-excludability which does 
not apply in our case. Indeed, the discussion of collective action has 
tended to focus on cases of public good provision where the incentives 
to voluntary action are problematic (Olson 1987). However , Ostrom's 
case of CPRs managed by groups, contrasts with private and state 
ownership solutions to the management of environmental resources in 
similar ways that the case of SACCOs and ASCRAs represent co-
operative solutions contrasting to private and state ownership in the 
case of financial institutions. The mam institutions for financial 
intermediation present in most contexts therefore mirror the three core 
'types ol 'institutions wriicn'tiave'Deen developed to address tiie core 
collective action problems that economic interaction produces: the 
stale, the firm and co-operative solutions. 
6 
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Developing a Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Financial 
Institutions 
If wc take the range of financial intermediaries that usually exist (and 
do so m Karatina - see below), we can locate them within particular 
approaches to solving the collective action problem as indicated in 
table 1. Institutions have been classified into 5 categories: 
I} Firm based financial intermediaries such as banks and non-
banking financial institutions (NBFls) which produce a solution to 
the financial intermediation problem which results in bi-latcral 
contracts between the institution, savers and borrowers 
independently of each other 
2} Co-operative solutions, which are by definition mutually, owned 
institutions for financial intermediation e.g. SACCOs, ASCRAs 
and ROSCAs. In these institutions borrowers from the institution 
must first be members (i.e. savers) in the institution and hence 
contracts to borrow are contingent on membership. 
3) State based mechanisms of financial intermediation such as 
parastatal lenders. These are based on the state's ability to tax and 
transfer resources from one group to another. These are very 
similar to 
4) N G O originated MFOs1 , which are also a vehicle in the first 
instance for the transfer of funds - in this case donor funds (public 
and private) and which are based in a collective action institution 
which has a charitable intent. 
5) Direct lending i.e. moneylending and reciprocal borrowing 
between friends and relatives. While these can be seen as 
1 MFOs have come to refer to all types of organisations offering finance 
to poor people including e.g. credit unions. Here we therefore 
distinguish N G O originated MFOs from other institutional forms. 
7 
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financial institutions, they are not collective action institutions as 
the intermediation of funds is between a single saver and one or 
more borrowers and in this context - while there are still a broad 
set of rules involved - this involves bi-lateral contracts and does 
not represent a form of collective action. 
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S T A T E 
Transfer based 
Parastatal lending 
institutions 
Intel-mediates funds on behalf of the state - thus an indirect fo rm of 
financial intermediation. The collective action problem of 
intermediation is solved by the state in a very specific way and this m a y 
be due to an analysis of "market failure". The parastatal 's remit and 
ability to make profit is in part a funct ion of the incentive structure 
imposed upon it by the state. 
N G O s 
Transfer based 
N G O originated M F O s N G O based MFOs usually intermediate funds f rom donors and of ten 
use group based lending thus impos ing a collective action solution on 
borrowers but their origins as N G O s are in a completely dif ferent type 
of collective action institution, i.e. usually a charity and these are 
privately owned institutions. 
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Direct lending 
i.e. does not 
involve 
collective 
action 
Moneylenders Private individuals, who lend their own money, hence are not a 
collective action institution because they do not take savings. 
Alternatively may be formal companies but operate under the theory of 
the firm with an objective of making profits. However their funct ion as 
a financial intermediary is limited to their intermediating shareholder 
funds, as they do not take savings to on-iend. 
Lending to friends and 
relatives (reciprocal 
lending) 
Private agreements, between friends and relatives whose rules, 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are mutually understood and 
agreed. These are bi-laterally negotiated and are not therefore 
collective action institutions. 
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MFOs, with state based financial institutions, are special cases of the 
financial intermediation problem which partly arise out of the view that 
collective action solutions to the financial intermediation problem 
based in banks have failed at the local level and these failures are 
usually referred to as "market failures". However , MFOs utilising 
group based lending attempt to use the collective action of borrowers 
in order to solve one aspect of the intermediation problem, which 
involves information and transaction costs in the making of lending 
decisions. Parastatals, on the other hand, have tended to utilise 
individual lending approaches based m the same principles as bank 
loans. 
It should be noted that government owned banks fall in the first 
category rather than that of the state as their primary collective action 
form is that of a firm as the rules, monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms are the same as they are for privately owned banks. 
In order to analyse these institutional forms further; we can examine 
the rules, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms that operate in 
each of these institutional forms. In her investigation into the design 
principles for CPRs, Ostrom proposes that rules for the operation of 
institutions are nested in levels and these are 3 tiered -
1) Operational rules - affecting day to day decisions regarding access 
to resource units, monitoring and sanctions and the operational level 
therefore involves processes of appropriation, provision, monitoring 
and enforcement 
2) Collective choice rules which indirectly affect operational rules -
they are the rules used in making policies and the management and 
adjudication of policy decisions 
12 
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3) Constitutional rules - affect operational activities and results through 
their effect in determining who is eligible and determining the specific 
rules to be used in craft ing ihe set of collective choice rules that in turn 
affect the set of operational rules. Any group that is going to undertake 
collective action has to agree a constitution m which the collective 
action and operational rules are embedded. The constitution has in turn 
a set of rules about how it can be changed. 
Sets of mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of the rules, i.e. 
mechanisms through which it will be known whether the rules have 
been broken and h o w transgression will be punished, accompany these. 
Thus we can examine the rules under which financial institutions are 
constituted and the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms they 
require to enable these rules to operate and this is done in table 2 for a 
range of financial intermediaries. 
Thus banksa re a specific form of financial intermediary, which operate 
as firms. Their management is appointed by shareholders that monitor 
performance. They have specific additional legislation because they 
are firms who can take other people ' s money as deposits and hence 
Banking Law is largely concerned with creating a framework within 
which to monitor this activity. The institutional framework for savers 
and borrowers is that they enter into contracts with the bank to deposit 
or borrow funds, which are governed, by banking law. 
In the sense of banks operating as institutions, we are interested in two 
aspects of their institutional arrangements. Fu st is the monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms related to the operation of it as a firm, and 
second is the particular institutional arrangements that affect the nature 
of its financial intermediation. Hence it is the management appointed 
by shareholders that design loan and savings services with the intention 
of making profi ts for the shareholders from this service. The means of 
monitoring and enforcing the rules that are related to saving and 
13 
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borrowing - especially borrowing - are the responsibility of the 
management of the bank but may be detailed in law also. For example, 
requirements to lend against collateral, the means of enforcement of 
e.g. loan repayment involves the management of the bank in using 
contract law to realise collateral in the event of non-payment. These 
are fundamental aspects of the nature of the service that banks can 
offer as financial intermediaries. 
By contrast to the institutional form of a bank, in savings and credit co-
operatives (SACCOs) the members are both the owners and managers 
of the organisation. In most countries Co-operative Law governs their 
operations and this involves the election of a Management Committee 
from the members and a range of other sub-committees. It is these 
that formulate the operational rules and monitor their implementation. 
In larger SACCOs the Management committee may appoint 
professional and paid managers but responsibility for management 
decisions lies ultimately with the members through the committee and 
annual general meeting structure. It is through these mechanisms that 
the members can directly influence the services that are provided, the 
profits that are made and the use of those profits. 
in the mutual sector the key difference between SACCOs and group-
based systems is the lack of formal registration with government - m 
this sense they are 1 informal \ Some ASCRAs may operate very 
similarly having committee based structures. ROSCAs are the simplest 
form of financial intermediation with mutual ownership that can exist 
and range in practice from well-organised and established groups to 
extremely loosely run systems. In all of these types of institution 
members have a voice. 
The mechanisms for enforcement of payment in these informal 
mutually owned institutions are dependent on a range of other 
institutions. They may be able to utilise the civil law in the case of 
14 
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debts, however u is often the case that they do not do this because of 
cost or the requirements involved of following these routes, and instead 
depend on a range of other types of sanction e.g. the seiz.ure of a 
members assets, or informal sanctions such a shame and reputation. 
Parastatal lending institutions arc distinct from e.g. government owned 
banks. Parastatal lending institutions are ones that do not raise savings 
in the form of deposits; rather the government uses its powers of 
taxation to raise funds, which it can then intermediate through the 
lending institution. The management is appointed by the government, 
the institution is accountable to government through the mechanism of 
us Act and whatever aspect of legislative rules which may also apply 
to parastatals. The enforcement of repayment of loans depends on the 
legal f ramework as it does for banks. 
N G O based nuc ro fmance offers financial intermediation on the basis 
of transfers1 , which are on lent to their target populations. With the 
growth of 'market driven* thinking m the NGO microfuiancc sector 
there are moves underway in many countries for MFOs to shift from 
the N G O sector into either the Banking sector - or in some cases to 
create a new regulatory category to cover MFOs. However it is most 
likely to be the case that these will be positioned within the banking 
sector operating as firms - the dif ference with banks will be in the 
nature of their capitalisation and related regulatory requirements. Some 
institutions within this category can be seen as in the process of 
transition f rom this category into either the firm based banks category 
or a new one still to be determined. 
2 It is the case that in some countries, Bangladesh being the prime example, 
N G O s have taken and intermediate saving;;. This is illegal with respect 
to constitutional rules of N G O s and banks but is allowed to happen due 
to regulatory forbearance and aptly demonstrates how the way in which 
these institutions operate is a function of the wider environment. 
15 
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1 able 2: Rules, monitor'jng and enforcement mechanisms for different types of financial intermediary 
FIRMS MUTUALS 
Banks S A C C O s A S C R A s R O S C A s 
Legis la ted 
rules / 
Cons t i tu t iona l 
rules 
Bank ing laws -
ma in ly to protect 
depos i tors 
C o m p a n y law 
Co-opera t ive law- No legislated rules. 
M a y be a wri t ten 
const i tu t ion but this 
may be more 
heavi ly based on 
m e m b e r s implici t 
unde r s t and ing of a 
set o f rules . 
N o legis lated rules. M a y be a writ ten cons t i tu t ion but 
this may be more heavi ly based on m e m b e r s implici t 
unde r s t and ing of a set of rules . 
Co l l ec t ive 
act ion ru les 
Made by 
sha reho lde r s and 
Board within 
cons t ra in t s ol"legal 
f r a m e w o r k 
M a d e by m e m b e r s 
( w h o are savers) -
A G M etc which 
can m o d i f y the 
const i tu t ion and 
moni to r 
m a n a g e m e n t 
M e m b e r s (savers) -
elect ion o f g roup 
of f ic ia l s 
M e m b e r s (savers) ~ elect ion of g r o u p of f ic ia l s 
Ope ra t iona l 
rules 
F .g . lending pol ic ies 
made by Ijoarri and 
m a n a g e m e n t 
M a d e by 
M a n a g e m e n t 
commi t t ee but 
p roscr ibed by law 
M e m b e r s m a y be in 
eve ryday 
opera t iona l rule 
implementa t ion as 
well as o f f i c i a l s 
M e m b e r s m a y be in e v e r y d a y opera t iona l ru le 
imp lemen ta t ion as well as o f f i c i a l s 
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Moni to r ing 
m e c h a n i s m s 
• F. Mental ly 
moni to red by cent ra! 
hank 
® Prof i tabi l i ty 
moni to red by 
sha reho lde r s 
« M a n a g e m e n t 
has respons ib i l i ty for 
r n o n n o n n g of 
f inancia l se rv ices 
A G M s , 
m a n a g e m e n t 
c o m m i t t e e 
mee t ings , sub-
c o m m i t t e e 
mee t ings In 
larger S A C C O s 
may have a paid 
m a n a g e r and stall 
for d a y to day 
opera t ions . 
Moni to r ing via 
regular meet ings at 
which repayments 
made and loans 
made, very easy to 
k n o w when 
someone hasn ' t 
paid 
M o n i t o r i n g in R O S C A s very easy as k n o w when 
s o m e o n e hasn ' t paid because no m o n e y for next 
person 
F o f o r c c m e n t Regu la t ions imposed For iate/non For late/non For la te/non p a y m e n t : 
m e c h a n i s m s hv Centra l Bank p a y m e n t . payment : Possibly f inancia l penal t ies 
Gradua ted Prof i t s . losses to Use of Possiblv f inancial Seizure of assets 
sanc t ions sha reho lde r s guaran tors . penal t ies Exclus ion Irom g roup 
L oan e n f o r c e m e n t which is Seizure of assets and/or social sanc t ions such as shame/ reputat ion 
hacked bv contrac t related to Exclusion f rom 
law for real isa t ion of peer group and/or social 
col la teral pressure sanct ions such as 
and shame/ reputat ion 
reputat ion 
At tachment 
of shares 
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T a b i c 2 c o n t i n u e d 
TRANSFER BASED 
STATE CHARITY 
DIRECT LENDING 
Paras lata Is N G O or ig inated M F O s M o n e y l e n d e r s Local i sed 
rec iproc i ty 
Leg i s l a t ed ru les / 
Cons t i t u t i ona l 
rules 
Cons t i t u t ed by act 
o f pa r l i amen t 
Cons t i tu t ed unde r char i ty 
o r N G O laws 
M a y be na t ional l aw which may 
s p e c i f y opera t iona l rules to extent o f 
p r i c ing (e.g. laws aga ins t usury) and 
leg i t imate m e c h a n i s m s for 
e n f o r c e m e n t 
C o m p a n y law may be used 
Norte 
C o l l e c t i v e ac t ion 
rules 
N o n e -
M a n a g e m e n t 
a p p o i n t e d by 
g o v e r n m e n t -
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y laid 
d o w n in Ac t 
Board appo in ted by 
invi tat ion - in turn they 
appo in t m a n a g e m e n t 
N o n e (unless involves a p r iva te 
sha reho lde r c o m p a n y ) 
None 
O p e r a t i o n a l 
rules 
O p e r a t i o n a l ru les 
m a d e by 
man age men l 
Opera t iona l rules m a d e in 
acco rdance wi th overal l 
vis ion and miss ion set by 
board . 
For lending - p r o g r a m m e s 
des igned and ru les set by 
m a n a g e m e n t 
Set by m o n e y l e n d e r - bo r rower en te r s 
into an a g r e e m e n t , which may be 
verbal or wri t ten. 
Usua l ly se t b y 
mutua l 
a g r e e m e n t 
be tween l ende r 
and b o r r o w e r 
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M o n i t o r i n g 
m e c h a n i s m s 
M o n i t o r i n g by 
G o v e r n m e n t in 
a c c o r d a n c e with 
Parasta ta l 
leg is la t ion 
M o n i t o r i n g of 
loans by 
m a n a g e m e n t 
M o n i t o r i n g of the N G O by 
e.g. C h a n t y 
C o m m i s s i o n e r s 
M o n i t o r i n g of l end ing is 
internal only 
If a c o m p a n y has lo abide by c o m p a n y 
law 
Moni to r ing by 
both lender and 
bor rower 
E n f o r c e m e n t 
m e c h a n i s m s / 
G r a d u a t e d 
s a n c t i o n s j 
1 
Loan e n f o r c e m e n t 
b a c k e d by cont rac t 
law for real isa t ion 
of col la teral 
M a y use social sanc t ions 
to d i sc ip l ine bo r rowers :n 
g roup based f inance 
s y s t e m s 
M a y use law cour t s to e n f o r c e con t rac t 
if wri t ten, may use in fo rmal 
e n f o r c e m e n t m e c h a n i s m s e .g . se izure 
o f i tems or social s anc t ions ( such as 
d a m a g e to r epu ta t i on ) 
May use law or 
more likely to 
use social 
sanct ions 
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However, NGO based microfmance is also a hybrid. In using group 
based approaches that are familiar to the group based mutual 
ownership systems, they seek to utilise aspects of the way in which 
these approaches operate in their own approach. However the 
difference in the use of mutual liability systems used by MFOs, is that 
they impose mutual liability on borrowers as a condition of lending 
whereas in the mutualist group based systems this is an endemic 
feature. Since one member is borrowing another member ' s savings, 
her potential default means that the member necessarily risks losing her 
money. 
Approaching the analysis of financial institutions in this way highlights 
the importance of the nature of ownership of the institution and the link 
between savers and borrowers in each type of institution that results. 
Implications of the Institutional Approach 
Analysing financial institutions as is done in table 2 leads us to a 
further series of propositions. First, it enables us to see that the 
effectiveness of certain types of financial intermediary is related to the 
effectiveness with which the rules can in practice be monitored and 
enforced. Thus it becomes apparent that the ability of a financial 
intermediary to operate is in turn dependent on a range of other sets of 
rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. One set of such 
institutions is those of property law, the effectiveness of the legal 
system in enabling collateral to be recovered and the effectiveness of 
the regulatory and supervisory structures. 
While informal systems such as ASCRAs and ROSCAs may have little 
recourse to legislated law they in turn depend on informal norms to 
enable the functioning of the system. This is not to say that informal 
systems cannot use the formal legal system. In fact, nearly all of the 
moneylenders in Karatma ensure that they have written agreements for 
2 0 
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the loans they make as this makes tt possible to pursue debts in courts 
of law, and one moneylender whose business had collapsed due to non-
payment by a small number of borrowers who had borrowed 
significant amounts f rom him, was in the process of taking his case 
through the courts. Although informal systems may use the courts they 
also rely on a range of other norms which are enforced through a range 
of sanctions sucii as guilt, shame and informational sanctions which 
may for example damage someone ' s reputation (Posner and Rasmusen 
1999). Such norms and sanctions are largely based in social and 
cultural meaning and practice. 
However it would be erroneous to suggest that such norms and 
sanctions only support the operation of forms of financial 
intermediation, which are informal. Rather, informal systems 
supplement and support the enforcement of formal rules in providing 
the basis of social order (DiMaggio 1994; Platteau 1994). So that, for 
example, the ability of shareholders and government to effectively 
monitor the performance of banks and parastatals arc in turn 
underpinned by the honesty and probity with which lending and 
monitoring is earned out within these institutions. Further, wider 
social views of debt and repayment obligations can affect the approach 
people take to repayment of loans and may differ between types of 
lender. Thus even though shame may not be a mechanism through 
which repayment of bank loans is formally enforced, it may be a 
contributory factor in ensuring payment from borrowers. 
This therefore highlights the fact that there are other institutions, which 
support the ability of a set of financial institutions to actually function 
as financial intermediaries. The range of these inst it utions is wide and 
encompasses institutions that arise out of aspects of culture (e.g. moral 
and religious values), social rules and norms, and political and 
economic relationships. Thus for example underlying political and 
economic structure influence the way in which the rules arc negotiated 
2 1 
IDS Working i'uper No. 533 
- and the way in which they are monitored and enforced in particular 
contexts. This f ramework therefore suggests that an investigation of 
the functioning of financial intermediaries in a given context requires 
examination of the underlying institutions that influence the ways in 
which the rules are formulated, monitored and enforced. These can 
help explain the emergence and relative performance of different types 
of institution. 
Second, and as Ostrom asks in the context of the development of 
institutions which govern CPRs, "why is it that some appropriators can 
supply themselves with new rules, gain quasi-voluntary compliance 
with those rules and monitor each other 's conformance to the rules, 
whereas others cannot?" (PI 85). How can the supply of institutions 
for collective action - or in this case financial intermediation - be 
explained? We can observe that in some contexts informal group 
based systems may be more abundant than others; in others' money-
lending for example may be more pervasive In the former case, a group 
of individuals have been able to switch f rom acting individually to co-
ordinating their activities and can share the benefits of this 
transformation. O s t r o n f s argument f rom a rational choice 
perspective, is that the individuals must be able to make safe, 
advantageous and credible commitments as long as most people in the 
same situation do so and long term expected net benefi ts exceed the 
payoffs to dominant short term strategies. 
So how can we understand when these institutions can emerge and 
when they do not? How do some people but not others overcome the 
problems associated with collective provision? She suggests that most 
institutional theories lack sufficient attention to external factors and 
instead concentrate on internal variables which in the case of CPRs are: 
the number ot decision makers; the number of participants needed to 
achieve the collective benefit; the discount rate; similarities of interest; 
and the presence of leadership skills. 
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Ostrom further argues that it is necessary to take account of the self-
t ransforming nature of institutions taking examples of OPR institutions 
that have started small and worked up into larger institutions. She says 
that there is an accretion process of 'social capital ' formed out of 
repeated interaction m these fora. She also suggests that the wider 
political regime can be important and that it is necessary to take 
account of information and transaction costs, which enable monitoring 
to take place. However, since the mechanisms through which this 
information can flow are social institutions, it is at this point that a 
rational choice approach fails to explain the set of choices that people 
face because it pays no attention to the resources they themselves bring 
to the institution as groups or individuals. She therefore points to, but 
falls short of, identifying the wider social, cultural, political and 
economic context out of which collective action can How. 
We can therefore propose that the array of financial institutions that 
exist in a particular context arise out of the ways in which solutions to 
the collective action problem have emerged out of underlying social 
structures. These responses are embedded in the social, cultural, 
economic and political environment in which they are operating both 
historically and currently. Hence the ability of groups of individuals 
to act collectively will be a product of these influences. This is equally 
the case, for example, for the emergence of entrepreneurs who are able 
to operate f i rms effectively. 
Finally, it becomes apparent through this approach that faced with an 
array of financial institutions, the ability of individuals to access 
services i.e. to interact with the rules of these institutions, will depend 
on their own endowment of social, cultural, economic and political 
resources. Without the required social resources an individual will not 
be able to engage in-group-based systems, for example. Economic 
endowments in terms of land and assets will determine their ability to 
obtain loans, which require physical collateral. Age and gender may be 
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a key factor in determining whether someone owns land which is 
inherited as young men may not yet have inherited land and women 
may never get the opportunity. We can therefore suggest that patterns 
of access which are embedded in their social and economic 
characteristics such as gender, age, caste, ethnicity are likely to arise. 
To summarise, the conceptual f ramework proposed here suggests that: 
]) to analyse the financial market it is necessary to go beyond an 
analysis of products to an analysis of the financial institutions 
which give rise to these products 
2) Those financial institutions are solutions to the financial 
intermediation problem, which is a collective action problem. 
There are essentially three types of solution based on the firm, the 
state and mutuality and these institutions can be analysed in terms 
of the ruies, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that enable 
them to function 
3} The actuai rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, which 
are implemented, are a result of the way they interact with politics, 
social relations, economic structures and cultures on the ground. 
4) At a societal level, the supply of institutions and the nature of the 
solutions which is generated is embedded in its political, social, 
economic and cultural resources both historically and currently. 
Thus, for example, the existence of mutualist solutions to the 
collective action problem will depend on the way in which its 
wider social and political institutions support their emergence. 
5) That patterns of financial service use will be discernible in relation 
!o social and economic characteristics such as gender, age, 
ethnicity, caste, religion, wealth and so on due to the way in which 
these socio-economic characteristics enable or disable people f rom 
interacting with the formal and informal rules of the financial 
institutions. 
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This therefore suggests an approach, which focuses on an analysis of 
the rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of financial 
institutions and the financial services to which they give rise. Through 
this we can develop a more funt fu! analysis of the ways in which 
financial services operate and the ability of particular socio-economic 
groups to use them. 
Financial Service use in Karatina 
The paper now presents some findings from fieldwork in Kenya. It 
first illustrates how gender underlies significant differences in the use 
of the services available. Then it shows how an understanding of the 
social sanctions available, which are differentiated by gender, can 
contribute to an explanation of these differences. 
'Fhe fieldwork was undertaken in Karatina in Kenya. Karatina was 
chosen on the basis of three criteria. First, m order to make the study 
feasible it was necessary to locate it in a small town which would allow 
the 'financial market ' to be geographically circumscribed. Second, 
MFIs were present in Karatina and had been for some time, so ensuring 
that they were well understood by their users, and it was a specific 
objective of the study to understand their role in the financial market. 
Third, there was a sufficient range of other financial institutions !o 
make the town interesting for this type of study. 
The fieldwork involved both supply and demand side surveys. Initially 
financial service providers were identified and all formal institutions 
were interviewed to document their services. For informal financial 
institutions such as groups, individuals were interviewed about the way 
their groups operated and attempts were made to capture the diversity 
of models in operation. The findings from this work covered formal 
financial organisations and do not involve estimates of informal group 
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and moneyiendmg activity. The formal sector banks, parastatals and 
NBFIs accounted for some 81% of deposits and 46% of savings 
accounts; it accounted for only 65% of loan volume. The SACCO 
sectors (rural and urban) while accounting for some 15% of deposits 
by volume accounted for 36% of savings accounts and 16% of loans 
by volume. The M F O sector, that included local NGOs that operated 
a revolving loan fund model, accounted for 5% of savings by volume, 
some 18% of savings accounts and 19% of loans by volume. These 
findings illustrate that while formal sector institutions dominate savings 
deposits when it comes to the numbers of people using them and the 
loan volumes the SACCOs and MFOs become important players. 
This was followed by a survey of individuals to investigate their use of 
the financial services on offer . The first round involved a random 
sample of 150 households in three locations. The locations were 
chosen to reflect the key livelihood contexts, a coffee growing area, a 
tea growing area and in the town where employment and enterprise 
dominate. Data on household characteristics f rom the first round was 
used to select a sub-sample of households for detailed investigation. 
The approach involved categorising households on the basis of 
household composit ion and headship, age of household head, and 
gender of household head, which the research had initially 
hypothesised as important. This resulted in a survey sample as shown 
in Table 3. In married households, both husband and wife were 
interviewed independently and confidentially about their financial 
service use to ensure openness and ensure that gender dynamics could 
be investigated. 
2 6 
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Table 4: Use of savings service by socio-economic characteristics (percentages) 
Sam ftnnKv Rural Empl Pes I ROS- Indetxmd Mana MFO Insurance 1nsurancr 1nsurance Oihcr 
pic Rutldi n£ SAC oyee office CA cnt gcd group group - group group savings 
Stzc vtK'CJy CO SAC savings ASCRA ASCRA tegular or (regular (irregular group 
CO access modular COnlribiili coninbtm 
on) on) 
Overall oR 45.6 33 8 10 3 8.8 48 5 8 8 5 9 7 4 39 7 17 6 25 0 2 9 
Sex * " 
Men H 51.5 45 5 3 0 12 1 30 3 <5 I 0 9 ! 36 4 11.2 21 2 0 
Women JO 0 22.9 17.1 5 7 65.7 S 6 114 5 7 42 9 14 3 28 6 5 7 
Marital status 
Married j ') 44 9 28 6 12.2 10 2 49 0 102 4.1 8 2 40 8 184 24 5 2 0 
Single 0 60.7 1 l.l i ! 1 0 44 4 11 1 ! I 1 11 1 J 3 3 11 1 33 1 1 1 1 
5ep/I>i voiced ' WI 7 33.3 0 33 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Widow cd 7 5 4 100.0 0 0 7 i 4 0 14 3 0 57 1 28 b 28 l> 0 
Age .«« 
•-•40 IS 48.7 12.8 12 8 10 3 53 S 10 3 5.1 7 7 35 9 12.8 25 6 5.1 
- 4 0 29 41 4 62 1 6.9 6 9 41 4 6.') 6.9 6.9 44 8 24.1 24 I 0 
fiducatioti « * « -! 
Primary A less 2') 17 2 44 8 0 10.3 4S 3 6.9 3.4 0 41 4 13.8 27 6 0 
Secondary & above W 00 J 25.6 17.<7 7.7 4S.7 10.3 7.7 12.8 38 5 20.5 2 J 1 5 1 
flotation * 
(/atundu-niral 22 .11.8 5 4 5 13.6 13.6 50.0 9 1 0 0 45.5 22,7 22.7 0 
Clithc-viiral 13.6 3 OA 4.5 4.5 45.5 4 5 4 5 0 40.9 9.1 3 1 8 0 
Ktiralina Town 2-i 57.5 12.5 12.5 8.3 50.0 9.5 12.5 20.8 33 3 20.8 20.8 8 3 
Individuals main 
income 
Agriculture 21 2.1 8 76.2 0 9,5 47.6 4.8 4.8 0 52.4 23.it 28.6 U 
fins in ess in 7S.9 21 ! 0 5.3 47.4 21 i 10.5 2 6 3 42.1 26 3 26 3 10 5 
Employment 12 83.3 16.7 58.3 25.0 50.0 8.3 8.3 0 25.0 8.3 16.7 0 
Casual labour 12 S 3 8.3 0 0 50.0 0 0 0 25.0 0 25 0 0 
None 4 0 (! O 0 .50 0 0 0 0 50.0 25 0 25.0 0 
KB - the It'vcl of significance is indicated for (he cell as a whole oil the basis of the cbi-square statistic for the cross-tabulation. 
* - significant {«; 10% level. i ignilieom ("< 5% level . ** - significant (i'} 1% level : - significant, (a} 0. i"A. level 
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Table 5: Use of" loan service by socio-economic characteristics (percentages) 
Sample 
S i « 
Bank 
IJuildmg 
society 
Rural 
SAC 
CO 
Employee 
SACCO 
M ! ; 0 M l : 0 
-ASCRA 
Independ-
ent 
ASCRA 
Money-
Icinler 
) ;ncnd ' 
Relet ive 
i V t a i 
stfcl 
llnlp' 
l oy« 
Overall OR 7 4 19 1 8 8 7 4 7 4 5 9 0 17?j 1 5 2 9 
Sex 
Men 
W otr.cn 
6 1 
8 6 
24 2 
14 3 
3 0 
14 3 
0 i 
8 6 
0 
14 3 
6 I 
5 7 
27 3 
8 ti 
0 
2 9 
1 0 
2 9 
Martial status 
Married 
Single 
Sep/Divorced 
Widowed 
49 
* 
S 2 
0 
V 3 
12 2 
0 
13 3 
85 7 
102 
11 1 
<! 
i) 
8 2 
0 
3 3 3 
0 
6 1 
11 ( 
0 
14 3 
6 1 
I ! 1 
O 
0 
14 3 
55 f> 
0 
0 
0 
0 
13 3 
0 
2 0 
11 1 
0 
0 
Age 
40 
—40 
O) so i 
3 4 
2 6 
4! 4 
10 3 
6 9 
5 f 
10 .3 
5 1 
10 3 
7 7 
3 4 
25 0 
6 9 
0 
! 4 
5 1 
0 
Education 
Primary A les's 
Secondarv & jbo\ c 
29 
i : s 
34 5 0 
; 5 4 
0 
12 8 
6 •'! 
7 7 
3 4 
7 7 
6 9 
25 0 
0 
2 6 
6 9 
0 
Location 
Go.'undu-rural 
Cheiie-r^ral 
Ksraltna 1\>wn 24 
4 S 
10 7 0 
13 6 
4 5 
8 3 
0 
20 8 
y 
•-) i 
12 5 
4 5 
0 
;2 5 
1 5 6 
27 3 
12 5 
0 
0 
4 2 
') 
4 5 
4 2 
Individuals m.ltn 
income-
Bus mess 
l 
Casual labour 
N:onc 
!•> 
1 2 
i s 
15 S 
0 
52 4 
a 
1? 3 
£ 3 
0 
50 0 
0 
0 
26 ' 
0 
0 
0 
i 8 
15 8 
* 3 
3 
0 
4 8 
1 5 8 
0 
0 
0 
14 3 
SO 5 
16 7 
3! 3 
25 0 
0 
5 3 
9 
0 
(J 
0 
5 1 
0 
8 3 
0 
KB - the level i-.f siiiiiifirance indicated for ;hc tell as a whole on the basis of the crn-square statistic for the ottos-tabulation. 
- - significant a; 10".. 'evri. *- significant ^ '•'<. level. " - significant /(J 1% !e\?! . - significant 1% fevel 
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Overal l , R O S C A s have the highest level of use at 4 9 % of the 
sample wi th bank ing services c lose behind at 46%. Chi-square 
tests suggest that there is a re la t ionship be tween use of banking 
services and level of educat ion and location, with those educated 
to secondary level and those l iving in town 3 be ing more f r equen t 
users. Thi rd in terms of overall use at 4 0 % are ind igenous 
insurance m e c h a n i s m s whether involving regular contr ibut ions or 
p a y m e n t s when the need arises. These m a y be nested in other 
savings g roups or based in, for example , l ineage groups . 
Rural S A C C O services (i.e. for tea and co f f ee farmers) are used 
more by men than w o m e n , more by those over 40 than those 
under 40, by those with p r imary educat ion and by those in the 
c o f f e e and tea zones than those in town. The chi -square tests 
suggest s igni f icance in these associat ions. Since rural S A C C O s 
arc almost by def in i t ion based on cash crops, their use in the tea-
g rowing zone of Chehe and cof fee g rowing zone of Ga tundu is 
clear. Cash crops tend to be under the control of m e n rather than 
women . Older people both retire to their f a rms and depend on 
these cash crops and this helps explain greater use in the older 
category as the sub-divis ion o f cash c rop land to chi ldren is o f t en 
done when sons are marr ied and seen as responsible. 
In terms, of soc io -economic characterist ics , gender appears to be 
a signif icant de te rminant o f rural S A C C O use and R O S C A use. 
In the case of R O S C A s 6 5 % of w o m e n were f o u n d to be in 
R O S C A s and only 3 0 % of m e n and this is the only socio-
economic characteris t ic ( inc luding a range of characterist ics such 
as consumpt ion pover ty levels, land ownersh ip , and asset scores 
that arc not reported here) that appears to a f fec t R O S C A access. 
' Gatundu sub-location is approximately 3 kms from town, and Chehe sub-
location is approximately 10km from the town. 
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The logistic regress ion me thod al lows us to look ai the effect of a 
single var iable whi le holding others constant"1. This therefore 
a l lows us to consider the marginal e f fec t that a part icular 
character is t ic has on raising or lowering the odds that an 
individual wilt use a part icular financial service. The logistic 
regress ions are reported m Annex 1 and conf i rmed gender to be 
the dr iv ing factor in increasing the l ikelihood of the use of 
R O S C A s . 
Table 5"1 examines the use of loan services (any loan obtained in 
the last 5 years) in a similar way. Rural S A C C O s are the most 
c o m m o n source of loans at 19%. Bor rowing f rom these is 
associa ted with age, educa t ion , location and be ing widowed. 
Bor rowing f rom fr iends and relatives is the second most used 
source of loans at 18% and the data suggests that bor rowing is 
more p reva len t a m o n g men than women , single people, those 
under 40, and those with secondary educat ion. 
Employee S A C C O s obvious ly depend on someone being in 
e m p l o y m e n t and this tends to be related to having a secondary 
educat ion. Bor rowing f rom the bank is as f requent as borrowing 
f rom M F O s and M F O A S C R A s . Bank bor rowing is again 
associated with educat ion and location. For M F O borrowing, 
be ing in business , in town and educated to secondary level are 
* In some instances the small number of reported cases of use of a service 
meant that meaningful logistic regression results could not be derived. 
The regressions therefore enable the socio-economic characteristics that 
were more likely to contribute to an individual using the more heavily 
used services to be analysed. 
5 While moneylenders arc part of the financial landscape in Karatina, there 
use is low and tends to be concentrated in the town. This and the 
relatively small sample explain the fact that respondents reported no 
moneylender loans. 
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important factors. M F O A SCR A p r o g r a m m e s 0 also have 
s igni f icant ly m o r e w o m e n than m e n borrowers , but this is an 
aspect of their targeting. 
Logist ic regression results conf i rm the fact that age and sex are 
the dr iving factors in access to loans through rural Saccos. A l so 
that a secondary educat ion and be ing young and male s ignif icant ly 
increase the chances of bor rowing f r o m fr iends and relatives (see 
Annex 1). 
Hence two o f the mos t s ignif icant results in the tables arise with 
a gender d imens ion : that R O S C A s are s ignif icant ly more likely to 
be used by w o m e n than men and that bo r rowing f r o m f r iends and 
relat ives is more likely to be under taken by educated and young 
men. 
Whi le the data sugges ts that there are clearly also other inf luences 
on access to f inancial services there is not suff ic ient space within 
this paper to discuss them all. The latter par t o f the paper 
therefore concent ra tes on trying to unders tand h o w these results 
highl ight ing the role of gender can be explained and the role the 
conceptual f r amework presented above can play in enabl ing this. 
Harly in the research when we were seeking to unders tand the 
diversity of in formal f inancial a r rangements , a range of statements 
were m a d e by in formants abou t the ability of men and w o m e n to 
function in groups . Dur ing qual i ta t ive interviews and focus g roup 
discuss ions with both men and women , we fo l lowed up on these 
s ta tements and asked informants to explain the different ial 
part icipat ion of men and w o m e n in groups , and specif ical ly 
Karatina has 3 local NGOs, which offer a service to women's groups in 
which they provide the model for women's revolving loan fund and, for 
a fee, assist the women to run the groups. 
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ROSCAs. Before discussing the results, the nature of ROSCAs 
m and around Karatina is described. 
ROSCAs in the Karatina Financial Landscape 
ROSCAs abound in and around Karatina and come in a variety of 
forms. My own expectation from earlier exposure to rural Kenya 
and the literature was of a group - usually of women - that meets 
weekly or monthly and where the next person in the line obtains 
the money or items that have been purchased. With a ballot being 
used to determine the order of receipt. 
However, ROSCAs in town and especially those based in the 
vegetable market most commonly operate on a daily or thrice 
weekly basis (market days) and simply appoint a collector to 
collect the money and give it to the next person in the list. When 
the ROSCA is formed there is a meeting to "kwamba" or initiate 
the group (kwamba is the term used to refer to the point from 
which a basket starts to be woven). At this meeting a ballot is 
held and the collector appointed. It is quite common for groups 
tn the market to never meet again and the order of the ballot never 
to be changed so that someone retains the same position in the 
order for years. One group wc found which started in 1976 had 
never met or re-balloted since. 
A ballot for the order of the cycle drawn at the very beginning 
appeared to be the commonest form in the town, Consequently 
people value ROSCAs in which they are near the beginning of the 
order. However, in the rural areas It was more likely that 
ROSCAs held monthly would be balloted at the meeting. A town 
based group of businessmen which runs a large ASORA had a 
weekly ROSCA attached to it which was balloted at the meeting 
and was seen as an incentive for meeting attendance. 
As people then leave the ROSCA, new members can be 
introduced to the collector who usually makes the decision about 
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who can join. New members are very often put at the end of the 
ballot as it is not known how trustworthy they are in making 
contributions and this means that they are less likely to upset the 
cycle by not paying once they have received their pay-out. There 
are benefits which the collector can gain f rom taking 011 this role 
such as being first in the ballot, being able to make their own 
contribution on the contribution day as late as possible (important 
in the market if business is slow) and giving status in the 
community. 
However, there are many ROSCAs in which members do not 
know each other. One woman joined a ROSCA in 1978 because 
she knew the collector, and the group consists of various business 
people around the town but she has never met the other members . 
As time goes on and people join and leave groups, the collector 
is often the only person who knows who all the members are. 
This appears to imply a degree of ease with which ROSCAs can 
be formed and operate. But on the contrary there appears to be 
excess demand for 'good 1 ROSCAs. As a consequence, when a 
stake (or place) becomes available in a well established ROSCAs 
it is quite often taken up by an existing member who wants to save 
more, and this also reduces the problem of introducing new 
members whose reliability is uncertain. As a result, a ROSCA, 
which started with 30 stakes, may, after a few years have only 10-
15 members and it is common for individuals to have multiple 
stakes in the same ROSCA. 
A further feature thai arises because of this system is that 
members may "carry" other people, called "gukuua" and literally 
meaning, "being carried on the back". Thus a member may take 
a stake in a ROSCA for which someone she knows but whose 
name does not appear makes the contributions on the list. Some 
groups say that they don ' t like this because it increases risks, but 
it is not possible to guard against it completely. 
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The character of the groups m the market can also vary in terms 
of the degree of strictness wiih which contributions have to be 
made - some charging fines for late contributions. Others are 
"patient" {kurekcni) and if members are a day or two late with 
their contribution are not penalised if it is for what is seen as a 
genuine reason. Bui if this behaviour is seen as laziness the 
person will soon be pushed out of the group at the end of the 
cycle. It was not possible to identify what might have brought 
about these differences m character of groups e.g. it was not 
necessarily the case that those which were kurekera knew each 
other well. Perhaps the most likely explanation is in the character 
and attitude of the founder(s) or collector of the group towards 
contributions. An old woman who had been the founder member 
of the group which had started in 1976 explained that a few years 
ago members had become lax with their contributions (which she 
attributed to deteriorating economic conditions} and they decided 
that they should become strict - they achieved this by seizing 
some items f rom non-paying members until they repaid. Through 
this means the discipline in the group improved. 
Group membership {ROSCAs and ASORAs) is now strongly 
perceived as a social safety mechanism, which has become an 
important need during the currcnt economic decline. The first 
way of using them when in urgent financial need is to swap 
positions in the cycle by petitioning a friend or the group as a 
whole. However, assistance can be sought f rom a group in other 
ways and groups may involve an insurance type function in which 
contributions will be made in the event that a member has a 
serious illness or accident, the death of a family member and so 
on. Members of one town based group of 90 businesswomen 
described with great pride how they had mobilised themselves to 
bury a member who was a single woman with no immediate 
family to do organise it. This support is now a strong motivation 
for joining or maintaining group membership. As an informant 
observed, if she takes her money to the bank then when she has a 
problem no one can help her. 
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By contrast to ROSCAs in the town, and particularly those in the 
market, ROSCAs in the rural areas tended to meet in the usual 
way - usually monthly. These are often clan based although 
women who have married into the clan and neighbours are 
allowed to join. An interesting new feature of ROSCA formation 
in these areas is groups called "muihuirururko" which means 
"going around" - in contrast to the usual term "gilati". Women 
dependent on their area of origin are forming these groups. As the 
marriage system is patrilocal, women belong to the "gitatis" on 
the basis that they are members of their husband's lineage, unless 
they have married into their own lineage. Since about 1997, 
women have started forming groups with other women who have 
married into the area but who are from the same area originally. 
However, this does not mean that they knew each other in any 
way before. Women we interviewed said that they often had no 
idea where someone who married into the area was from - and 
hence were surprised when they found out thai a woman might 
have known their own family. Thus in the rural area we visited 
there were separate groups which had been formed by women 
from Othaya and Ndia. There have an expanded social function 
compared to itati and involve a whole afternoon of socialising, 
eating and drinking while undertakingROSCA business. Women 
explained that they get psychological support f rom knowing other 
women from their area who, they felt, might understand their 
problems better than women f rom the same clan as their husbands. 
Some felt that this was also a further means of mobilising 
assistance in times of hardship. 
Group Participation: Gender Differences in Social Norms and 
Sanctions 
In this section we now turn to explanations for the different levels 
of participation of men and women in-groups. 
One young man succinctly described the social importance of 
groups to women: "To a woman a giuiti is her lifestyle it's her 
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way of life ... a woman is not a woman until she is m a giiati ". 
The main role of groups for women is as a means of providing 
themselves with household utensils. They noted that that if you 
enter the house of a woman who is m a group then it will be 
noticeable because she will have cups, plates and sufunus 
(cooking pots). Women explained ihat while a man would were 
interested tn building a house, he will not be concerned with 
buying what goes inside it. While some men expect those things 
to be there even though they will never buy them, others will not 
care: "if there is no cup to drink f rom he will just tell you to 
bring the tea in the su/uno[." 
Women explained that since women in their groups arc not all of 
the same age. this social context enables them to learn how to 
speak properly in public and the older women cducale the younger 
women on how to handle things in their homes and discuss 
problems with their husbands. Their ability to buy a sweater or a 
smart dress as a result of the group and be dressed smartly and 
cleanly enables them to gain in self-esteem and mix freely with 
richer people - "You can become a woman". This was judged 
important by town women who felt that their men will run away 
if they were not smart because he would compare her to a woman 
dressed smartly that he had met in a bar. But although he wants 
her to dress well he will not provide the money to do this. "Men 
just need to see liie woman in the house ...so it's upon her to get 
the way to dress and manage the house." 
In the rural area, women felt that having household utensils served 
a broader social function. Not only could she host a lot of visitors 
without having to go looking for cups f rom neighbours, but she is 
also the first to be invited to local social functions as she will take 
her utensils with her to assist. Those women, who do not join 
groups locally, al though they can afford to, are seen as being 
proud and self-sufficient and not wanting to mix with others, if 
these people get a problem and need assistance they must invite 
3 7 
IDS Working I 'aper No. 533 
their fr iends who are not in-groups because the others will not 
come. 
This briefly indicates the social importance to women of joining 
groups. Further evidence related to the social sanctions that are in 
operation to monitor and enforce the operation of the group. The 
primary social sanction seems to be that of shame. This was 
reported in a range of ways. 
We were told that women feel shame if they are unable to make 
a contribution to their R O S C A - they will rather borrow f rom a 
friend to take money to the group than not pay as they do not want 
to be embarrassed and "spoil" the group. Nor does she want the 
shame of people coming to take things f rom her house. As one 
woman put it: 
"it is embarrassing to go to a gilati without money,„.you 
are going to be told to give them their money ~ you have 
helped yourself and used the money and today you are 
giving another person, so you have to pay it back. You 
are going to spoil your name and people will be fearing 
you - seeing you as someone who doesn ' t pay, I would 
prefer to ask someone to give me the money than to go 
to the gitafi without the money...if you can ' t pay they 
may come to take your security, your TV.., It is not 
good...it will be auctioned.... Would you be happy? The 
children will be asking questions - how do I answer 
1'hfynZ" 
An auctioneer, who had been appointed by a local N G O to pursue 
debts owed to groups within managed ASCRA programmes, said 
that when women hear that the auctioneers have been to their 
homes, then they come quickly to look for him because they do 
not want people around to know about it. A moneylender 
reported to us that with recently deteriorating economic 
conditions, women in local microfmance groups were borrowing 
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f rom h im 10 repay their g roup loans - at 4 0 % per month - because 
they want to avoid the shame of the group member s coming to 
take their assets. He takes consumer durables as collateral and he 
descr ibed h o w they would send someone else with the asset and 
visit h im separately a f t e rwards to get the money . 
Men also seek to avoid putt ing w o m e n in a situation where they 
might exper ience s h a m e through not be ing able to pay. Both 
wives and husbands expla ined that husbands had refused when 
they asked to .join a gi tat i These were cases where the wife was 
asking to jo in and for the husband to give her the contr ibut ions 
because she had no independent income of her own. If the 
husband felt that he could not reliably come up with the 
cont r ibut ions he felt it was better for the wife not to join, as he did 
not want her to be embar rassed in the group by his failure to bring 
m o n e y for her. Where w o m e n have their own incomes or are 
given housekeep ing m o n e y then it is usually up to them how they 
m a n a g e it. If they wish to make contr ibut ions to groups f rom this, 
they are usual ly free to do so7. 
T h e need to avoid br inging shame on w o m e n also extended to a 
rural money l ende r (male) who expla ined that he could lend to 
w o m e n in town but not in rural areas. In town women have their 
o w n incomes and in this way "are like men" . Whereas in the 
vil lage, if he lends to a w o m a n and she cannot repay he will bring 
shame on her. If her husband was not aware of the borrowing 
then it was poss ib le to bring confl ict to the h o m e and he feared 
be ing b lamed for caus ing the p rob lem, which would in turn reflect 
badly on him. In the rural area it is in any case mainly the 
; An exception to this arose in one area where less well of young men did 
not seem to like their wives belonging to groups. This seemed to be due 
to a sense of insecurity in their marriage - they did not wish their wives 
to be bringing things for the house because they fek the women would 
boast about iL and undermine their status ns head of the household. 
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h u s b a n d ' s income that will be used to repay. His pol icy was 
therefore only to lend to w o m e n in the vil lage if a man she trusts 
c o m e s wish her - this could be a male f r iend or relative. So that 
he could give the m a n the m o n e y and the m a n would then give it 
to the w o m a n . 
Men on the other hand, have expendi ture responsibil i t ies, which 
involve bulky paymen t s for school fees, asset accumula t ion and 
so on. T h u s for men, g roups are a means of f inancing these 
responsibil i t ies and they need to be in groups where the payments 
are higher to be able to achieve this in the space of t ime they see 
as acceptable . 
Also in contrast to w o m e n , the social norms and sanct ions are 
dif ferent for men. T o start with, the social isat ion process of 
young men is less likely to involve group member sh ip and 
activities than it is for w o m e n . Groups are not part of Kikuyu 
m e n ' s cu l ture and social ne tworks in the way that they are for 
women . Hence a man may only learn about groups f r o m his wife 
once he has got married. 
We came across m a n y cases of failed men's groups , especially in 
the town, and men themse lves explained this as the result of a 
more individualist ic cul ture a m o n g them. One young male 
in formant w h o was an o rphan brought up by female relatives had 
set out to f o r m groups in order to meet his own needs fo r saving 
and taking loans ( through an A S C R A ) . He had started by doing 
(his with some local w o m e n - he explained that he had been able 
to do this because as an o rphan he was "eve rybody ' s son" and 
hence had close relat ionships with local women . He observed that 
the w o m e n were not used to saving and then taking loans to 
under take investments rather they were used to saving for 
household items. However the progress of the w o m e n ' s group 
they had started contrasted greatly to the g roup he tried to form 
among his young male fr iends: "The men can't easily agree and 
each has to have his say, w o m e n arrive for meet ings and have 
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commitment. . . men relax and come m a reluctant manner... they 
prefer to he m bars and be individual, they can't listen to others 
ideas.... They prefer to be dictators." Other men explained that 
men could not mix with each other since they do not want to be 
seen as needing to depend on others and hence being seen as 
inferior. They do not like to consult each other when they have 
problems but prefer to keep their problems to themselves: "men 
are proud and do not trust each other". One said, "every man is 
clever.... You know- someone is going to mess you up" (i.e. if you 
get into a group with them). 
This situation is further reflected in the fact that soctal sanctions, 
which enforce women's compliance with group rules, do not hold 
for men. Both men themselves and women explained that men 
have a "don' t care" attitude. Men reported that they did not like 
the strictness of the rules involved m-groups and the fines they 
would incur if they didn' t attend. 
Often the rules of the group are not written down and men realise 
that nothing can really be done to them if they do not pay, so they 
do not fear not paying. If a woman is not able to complete her 
payments in the group then the group can just go and repossess 
the items but a man will resist this. Women explained that this 
was why they could not have men m their groups: 
"Men don't like struggling...he won't struggle to get 
money for the meeting, he will just say he has nothing in 
his pocket and what will you do to make him pay? You 
go to his place to start selling things and he will just say 
no. Whereas a women, if she doesn't have money, will 
borrow from a friend - even get it f rom her husband - but 
men don't like coming to meetings and complying with 
rules. " 
A woman observed that men do not feel shame in the way that 
women do, with a local saying: "ihoni cia arumc ciri igoti" which 
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in translation means "the shame of men is at the hack of the head". 
It refers to the fact that when a woman feels shame then it is 
evident in her face and she is unable to look you in the eye, but a 
man will not feel such shame and will hold his head up high, in 
this case> when telling you he has no money to bring to the group. 
This d i f ference between men and women is underlined by an 
informant whose wife had been a member of a local M F O group 
and taken a loan for a piggery project at home for which he had 
been providing the weekly repayments. He explained that he did 
not want her to take another loan because he did not feel thai she 
would be able to make a business work in the current economic 
climate and did not want her to be shamed by him not being able 
to provide her with repayments. He said that he would rather take 
the loan himself because he would "know what to do " if he could 
not find the payments and that the worst that could happen to him 
was 6 months in civil jail. 
An old woman in her 70s who had a group in the market which 
had been running since 1976 explained that there were two men 
in their group now and one of them is the collector who is very 
young and also a market trader. They al lowed him to join the 
group because they have known him since he was born. She said 
that they can only let in men who have impeccable behaviour and 
that men must humble themselves to join. 
In the town numerous cases of fights having occurred over group 
breakdown were reported and some young male informants had 
the scars to show for it. Some of these cases involved con men 
claiming to start groups and canvassing the young men in town to 
make contributions. These groups never met and by the time it 
came to their (urn they would not get the money. They knew that 
even if they took the case to the police they would get nowhere. 
A good reflection on the need for strong sanctions to be available 
and enforceable was a case where a group had been formed 
among the Meru community in Karatina. The collector was a 
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pol iceman and ail paid because they feared him - the group died 
when the pol iceman was transferred out of the area. 
H i t s is not to say that men do not join groups - whether m e n ' s or 
w o m e n ' s - or that they do not also value groups. In fact a number 
of young men demonst ra ted their eagerness to join a ' good ' group 
- which usually meant a reliable w o m e n ' s group and lamented 
their inability to gam access to such groups. Some young men 
reported "being carr ied" by w o m e n in-groups. For a young man 
who has a good enough relationship with a w o m a n who trusts 
h im. this is one of the few ways he can access reliable groups 
when he is not yet married and cannot therefore do this through 
his wife. 
However , men also report that c i rcumstances have changed 
great ly in recent years and especially in the last 2-3 years. Many 
men reported that they had now jo ined self-help groups due to the 
hard t imes they were facing as the economic downturn has 
"humbled ( them) in then homes" . Men are now finding it difficult 
to take loans f rom banks due to high interest rates. Min imum 
balance requi rements for savings accounts had also been raised, 
making it more diff icul t to save and earn interest there. They said 
that in the past groups were just for women, but they have come 
to see what w o m e n have been able to achieve in the home as a 
result of being in the groups . They now need to be able to save 
little by little and this is one of the few ways in which they can 
acquire small assets. As a result they have had to learn how to 
behave in-groups. Further, given that they are having financial 
p roblems they have found that they can share these 111 the group 
without having to go around telling ail of their friends about their 
p roblems and asking for money. 
Men have tended to start their own groups because they see 
w o m e n ' s groups as deal ing with small things i.e. household items 
such as utensils, where as men they need to save for purposes such 
as school fees and investments. One group of men said that the 
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group has started as m e n ' s g r o u p (in the rural area) but wives 
c a m e on behalf of their husbands and it b e c a m e hard to exc lude 
them. They compla ined that when w o m e n come m they "change 
the minds of the men to m a k e them think of small things" but that 
they did not want to change their minds to w o m e n ' s way as they 
want to do "big things"". 
One w o m a n felt that g roups func t ioned better with men in them 
because w o m e n goss ip and tend to forget about the g roup bus iness 
but "men have knowledge and can make them work proper ly" . 
Indeed, some men compla ined about be ing in-groups with 
women . They said that they were likely to be k ind to each other 
if they paid late {"kurekera" groups) and they did not like this 
because it would mean that they did not get the whole amoun t of 
the money when they were supposed to. Also that w o m e n could 
shelter behind their husbands if they did not pay and it was 
necessary to seize their assets. 
W o m e n said that men do not like to be in-groups with w o m e n 
because they have their own issues and these m a y involve using 
larger amoun t s of money . Then if they are in a g roup with a 
woman who knows his wi fe then she is likely to tell the wi fe when 
he has received the m o n e y and he m a y want to ensure that he can 
use it for his own purposes . Equal ly some w o m e n prefer red not 
to be in g roups with their husbands because they thought that their 
husbands would start budge t ing for h o w to use her pay-out when 
she got it and she would lose control of it. 
Conclus ions 
This paper has deve loped a f r a m e w o r k that considers financial 
insti tutions as fo rms of col lect ive action and as a result focuses on 
K The economic dimension of gender embeddedness will be the subject 
a future paper. 
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the rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that are 
nece-ssary to enable them to operate. This approach demonstrates 
the endemic fragmentation of the financial landscape, as different 
types of financial intermediary are the result of different forms of 
collective action. The framework further allows the relationship 
of financial institutions to social relations to be explored through 
an investigation of the effectiveness of the rules, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms. Here we have used the case of shame 
as a social sanction underpinning the operation of ROSCAs to 
illustrate how financial institutions are embedded in gender 
relations. 
The above evidence demonstrates the way in which the informal 
sanction of shame critically underlies women ' s greater 
participation in ROSCAs. For men, shame is insufficient as a 
sanction and where formal contracts do not exist and amounts of 
money are small, recourse to the legal system is cumbersome, 
costly and t ime consuming. The inability of women to enforce 
informal sanctions on men can also be a reason for their 
exclusion. Only those men over whom women feel they have 
sufficient power - those who have "humbled themselves" - may 
be allowed to join w o m e n ' s groups. Thus it follows that the 
sanctions that underlie these financial institutions have significant 
gender dimensions that explain the relative effectiveness of 
different types of financial institution for different socio-economic 
groups. 
Further, while the above discussion helps explain the significance 
of gender in ROSCA participation, it also suggests reasons why 
young men are more likely to borrow from friends and relatives, 
li becomes clear that men do not have social relationships that 
enable them to join groups to meet their financial needs as easily 
as women - some men acknowledge that, out of necessity, they 
are now learning the behaviour to do this. Rather they are more 
likely to turn to friends when they are unable to access forma! 
finance - this is. by their own account, the way they are most 
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likely to operate. The difficulty of being male and young relates 
to not being married and having fewer routes through which to 
access w o m e n ' s groups or having not yet learnt through wives the 
behaviour necessary to operate successfully in a group. 
The study has used evidence f rom Karatina to both inform its 
conceptual f ramework and to demonstrate how this f ramework 
may be applied. It is anticipated therefore that the conceptual 
f ramework may be used to explore the dynamics of financial 
markets in other contexts but that any particular landscape will be 
rooted in the social, economic and political institutions that enable 
rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of different types 
lo function more or less effectively. With this perspective it is 
anticipated that the formation and functioning of that landscape 
can be better understood. 
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Annex 1: Results of iogistic regressions 
The results of logistic regressions estimated for participation in 
ROSCAs and borrowing from friends and relatives were as 
follows: 
Table A! : Logistic regression on ROSCA use 
R OS CA 
Sex: 
Men 
W o m e n 4.22'* 
Marital status: 
Married — 
Single .8 1 
Scp /Divorced .002 
Widowed 3.85 
Age: 
< 4 0 
> " 4 0 .41 
Ktiutal ion: 
Primary & less — -
Secondary & above 1.89 
Locat ion: 
(illtwutll . . . . 
( ' h c h e 87 
Karat ina Town 
Individuals main income: 
A g n c u i m i e 
Business 
Hmployment — -
Casual labour .68 
None 1.00 
Cont inuous variables: .75 
Cons Poverty .16 
Asset score 
Landho ld ing .88 
1.01 
LOS 
1 - S igni f icant Uo 10% levc!; *- s ignif icant (u>. 5% level, ** - s ignif icant (aj 1% 
Interpretat ion ' t he va lue of the variable with ' — " in each case is 1. The result 
g iven shows ihe marginal i nc rease (> I) or reduct ion ( < i ) in the odds ratio, in this 
case the l ikelihood that a woman used a RO SCA was 4.22 t imes h igher than the 
l ikel ihood ih;!! ;t m;m would use a K O S C A and ibis was s ignif icant at ihe 5 % 
level. 
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Table A2: Logistic regression on rural SACCO use 
Rural S A C C O 
Sex: 
Men 
W o m e n 0 05 s 
MsrHai status: 
N!oi married 
Married 0 14 
Age: 
< 4 0 — . 
>=40 33.2<)*** 
Educat ion: 
Primary & less — 
Secondary & above 1 25 
A s ^ t score: 
0-5 . . . . 
<>-10 1.85 
1! -20 6.58 
>21 0 .00 
The logist ic regress ion indicates ihe s igni f icance of age as a dr iv ing factor in 
increasing the o d d s of us ing a rural S A C C O - if you are over 40 ihis increases the 
odds of rural S A C C ( ) use by 33 fold compared <o being under 40. Whereas being 
a woman reduces ibe odds by 20 fold compared to be ing a man . This can be 
expla ined via pat terns of cash c rop cont ro l , which is p redominant ly in the hands 
of men and pat terns of land sub-divis ion and inheri tance, which are s t rongly 
related to age 
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Table A2: Logistic regression on borrowing from friends and 
relatives 
Relat ive/ 
f r iend loan 
S e x : 
Men 
W o m e n 0 . 1 6 6 + 
Marital status; 
Not married — 
Marr ied 0 .187 
A f>e: 
< 3 0 
30-44 0 .075+ 
>45 0 .073+ 
Educat ion: 
Primary & less . . . . 
Secondary & above 49 .032** 
Locat ion: 
Rural . . . . 
Karatina 1'own 0 .056 
Main i n c o m e : 
Agricul ture — ~ 
Business & E m p l o y m e n t 1.825 
Casual labour & None 10.462 
Asset score: 
0-5 
6-10 0.691 
! 1-20 1.019 
>21 0 .34 
Since the sample yie lded lew cases with which the logistic regression could work 
lor noiim: services, it was necessary to select the variables to be included wiih care. 
In the case of bo r rowing f r o m fr iends and relat ives, a secondary education is the 
most s ignif icant in increas ing the odds tha tan individual wilt bo r row f r o m f r iends 
and relat ives , at (he s a m e t ime be ing older and being a w o m a n reduced the odds 
s ignif icant ly . S ince odd ratios are mult ipl icat ive, hav ing secondary educat ion, 
be ing y o u n g and male increases (he oddS hugely. 
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